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American Foreign Policy and
International Law
Eugene V. Rostow
My topic today is the political element in international law,
and its significance, both to law, and to legal education. I didn't
suppose, when the theme was chosen for me, long ago, that I
should be talking in the midst of an international crisis entirely
dominated by the politics of international law, or the law of in-
ternational politics. My effort, however, will be to map the back-
ground of the crisis, not to offer simple and comforting solutions
for our difficulties in the Middle East and Eastern Europe.
I
Let me start with some rather obvious general propositions
which frame the analysis I propose to sketch out.
First of all, I assume, I shall not have to defend at any length
the thesis that international law, like any other branch of law,
has a political content, and exists in a political context. Interna-
tional law is the system of order for the society of nations. It is
a field of force in which contending interests and ideas strive
for - and occasionally find - a transitory equilibrium. Inter-
national law is not an abstract and immutable code, to be treated
reverently by a few anointed successors of Grotius and Pufen-
dorf, and invoked only to curb the evil impulses of statesmen.
On the other hand, however, international law is law, in every
meaningful sense, despite the absence of a single sovereign, or
rather, despite the multiplicity of its sovereign commands. In-
ternational law is not expressed in the mold of law as a conven-
tion or formality. It is law because it represents the authorita-
tive consensus at any time of the propositions which, in the light
of their goals, help to fix the scope and expression of competing
national purposes, and equally, to fix the modalities of interna-
tional cooperation.
Large areas of international law are now being dissolved and
reformed, and much of its most important content is being born.
The reason for this fact is obvious: the political forces and the
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dominant ideas which determined the contours of international
law in the past are in motion, and often in violent motion. New
social needs, and newly insistent ideas of right and wrong, are
pressing against the pattern of historical custom.
International law in its traditional forms developed in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and went through a period
of relatively gradual evolution during the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. The hundred years after 1815 considerably
changed the map of the world, and to a certain extent they also
changed the law which courts and chancelleries accepted as gov-
erning the relation of states, both in peace and in war. But that
age, which now seems so peaceful and so civilized, was also a
period of relative stability in the states-system itself - in the
concept of the state, and the permissible limits of its powers, and
in the basic relationship of states and peoples to each other.
The two world wars of this century, however, have released
forces which destroyed the old order of things - the old order
within which this nation emerged, and managed to grow and
survive. The Austrian, Russian, Turkish, and German Empires
were broken up, to be succeeded in the name of national self-
determination by many weak states, often a temptation to ag-
gression. In the case of Russia and Germany, the old empires
were also succeeded by powerful and ambitious home govern-
ments, harboring bitter resentments at defeat, and strong desires
for revenge. And now, in a cycle accelerated by the Second
World War, we are witnessing the breakup of the British, French,
and Dutch Empires - together with the related system of pro-
tectorates, mandates, and special spheres of influence and re-
sponsibility, which served as the cement of the old structure.
Whatever else may be said of the fading system of empire,
it must be conceded in retrospect that it drew many isolated and
autonomous cultures into a single world, and, all things consid-
ered, into a relatively coherent and interdependent world, during
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and the early part of this
century. For long periods of time, imperalism preserved a sem-
blance of order and stability in international affairs. The Em-
pires brought the powerful ideas and techniques of Western life
to every corner of the globe. Ancient cultures like those of Islam,
India, and the Orient were set on a new course, and primitive cul-
tures were equally exposed to the explosive impact of European
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life. The response of the non-European world to the promise and
the power of Western science, methods of organization, and
social outlook has not, of course, been uniform. For all non-
European countries, their contact with the West was, and re-
mains, a process of action and reaction, of attraction and repul-
sion- a continuing process of incalculable moment. As Chris-
topher Dawson has recently remarked, this experience cannot
realistically be considered merely one of revolt against the influ-
ence of an alien, European civilization; rather, it is a more com-
plex cultural movement, involving the extension of Western civil-
ization and of Western international society into the extra-
European world.' If wisely conducted, this movement can lead
to a consensus among all peoples on certain values which they
may share, despite their cultural diversity. Alternatively, it may
lead to bitterness, destruction, and revolt.
We who are brought up in the spirit of 1776 tend instinctively
to scorn every aspect of imperialism, and automatically to sup-
port any rebel against imperial power who wraps himself in the
mantle of George Washington, and demands freedom for his
people. This almost universal American reaction to the colonial
question sometimes interferes with clear thought, both in our
scholarship and in our politics. For all its many faults, the im-
perial system served a function in its day, as our own history tes-
tifies. We can hardly expect to cope with our own world unless
we understand the pressures which the old international system
set in motion all over the world. Nor will our international law
serve society even as well as the international law of the im-
perial age unless it develops politically acceptable methods for
carrying out certain responsibilities to the family of nations
which imperialism did meet, for better or for worse.
A second and distinct factor in the political universe of in-
ternational law is the emergence of the Soviet system and the
world Communist movement, and their prodigious growth and
spread since 1917, and especially since 1945. This system, using
as its tools both Western science and technology, and Western
socialist ideals of justice, humanity, and the rights of man,2 rep-
1. Dawson, The Relevance of European History, 6 HISTORY TODAY 606, 612
(Sept. 1956) : "Thus it seems to me impossible to avoid the conclusion that the
new Asia and Africa which are emerging with such revolutionary suddenness do
not represent simply the reaction of Asiatic or African culture against the influ-
ence of an alien civilization, but rather the extension of Western civilization and
Western international society into the extra-European world."
2. Id. at 611-12.
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resents one phase of the historical process to which I have just
referred- the adaptation of an appealing western tradition to
the history and needs of non-European cultures. The Communist
world today has been swaying and fumbling, internally, under
the impact of the de-Stalinization movement, with its powerful
appeal to the premises of Western law. The old conflict in Rus-
sian life between East and West, between the Europeans and the
Orientalists, between the pull of law and the tradition of despot-
ism, has been revealed in a new form. The pendulum has swung
to both extremes in recent months, and is now of course back on
the side of Stalin and Ivan the Terrible. Whether Peter the Great
will have another turn soon remains to be seen. What we know,
however, is the simple fact that the enormous mass of power or-
ganized under Communist rule is led by able and determined
men, who command formidable resources, both material and in-
tellectual. They control gifted populations, whose skills are con-
centrated on the tasks which the Communist leaders deem most
important - namely, upon problems of military technique and
technology. They have achieved a rate of capital accumulation
far greater than our own, and will soon command an industrial
base greater than our own, and more completely mobilized for
military purposes. Their schools and universities are dominated
by first-class talents, and are graduating large numbers of imagi-
native, well-trained, and productive men and women.
Recent months have seen dramatic and significant develop-
ments in the Soviet Union. The present leaders of the country,
revolted by the tyranny and despotism through which Stalin had
controlled his bureaucracy, and his people, have paid limited
obeisance to the tradition of law, and they have been enthusias-
tically followed in Poland and Hungary, at least, among the satel-
lites. This movement may be reversed; indeed, events in Hun-
gary may already have reversed it. Even if de-Stalinization par-
tially survives the Hungarian cataclysm, a new Napoleon, or a
new Hitler or Stalin, may succeed in capturing the machinery of
totalitarian power in the Soviet system, before saner men can
establish a regime of law under Communism.
From the point of view of the security and foreign policy
of the United States, our initial reaction to de-Stalinization was
dangerous. We tended to welcome this development not only for
its own sake, but as a move towards peace. But the requirements
of peace go beyond the achievements of partial or minimal le-
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gality in the Soviet Union and its satellites. The Germany of the
Kaisers, the Russia of the Czars, and Imperial Japan before
World War II were all states in which the relationship of citi-
zens to each other, and to the State, was governed by settled rules
and procedures of law. The world will not be safe, and we will
not be safe, until the growth of law within the Soviet Union. and
its associated and satellite states includes not merely order but
freedom. The legitimate fear which makes us and the world in-
secure will not be dissipated until the existing monopoly of power
in the hands of the Communist Party is ended - until the public
life of the Communist states has been so modified as to destroy
the threat of aggression now dangling over the heads of all peo-
ple, including those under Communist rule. Indeed, an orderly
and "legal" New Model Communism may be a far more formi-
dable foe for us in Asia than the brutal regime of Stalin. Such
a Communist movement could offer the Orient economic prog-
ress without the gross and obvious forms of tyranny and deceit
which now characterize the atmosphere of Communist politics.
The outcome of the ideological struggle within the Communist
world is still unknown. American foreign policy must continue
to rest on a recognition of the fact that the Communist movement
is strong, aggressive, hostile, and determined, and that it does not
lack opportunities for gain, from Formosa to Egypt.
II
As the result of the breakup of the old imperial order, and the
rise of Communism, the world balance of power is tipping badly
against us. The conditions of our security as a nation, which con-
cerned the United States only sporadically in the nineteenth cen-
tury, have now become the central theme of national policy,
framing and coloring all the other problems of our national life.
The pressure of this anxiety is deeply felt in many areas - in
the continuance of the draft, so alien to our history; in the level
of taxation, with its drastic impact on our social structure, and
on the pattern of incentives in our working lives; in the com-
plexities of the loyalty-security program, which casts serious
shadows over the constitutional relationship between the individ-
ual and the state; and in the renewed urgency with which we
have tackled the difficult social problems of achieving full con-
stitutional equality of status for the Negro.
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The old order, which was the determinative matrix of the
old public international law, is gone, beyond recall. Yet a new
order has not yet emerged. The old public international law still
functions, in large part, but it is in constant collision with new
ideas, usages, and customs, and something new is clearly coming
out of its chrysalis.
The essence of our problem of national security, I submit, is
to help transform the international chaos we now confront into
a stable and just system of international law. The liberation of
people formerly under colonial rule, and the rise to modern power
of China and Russia, are historical events full of hope, and of
danger too. There is no need to stress the risks of direct expan-
sion by China or the Soviet Union. The plight of the newly liber-
ated peoples of the world presents problems as grave. Many of
the formerly dependent areas of the world, newly endowed with
nineteenth-century rights of sovereignty, are economically stag-
nant. Some are growing slowly, at a time when the industrialized
nations of the West, and of the Soviet bloc, are growing very fast
indeed. In many cases, the cutting of imperial ties has dimin-
ished the flow of capital and of entrepreneurship without which
growth is impossible. The break-up of the world financial sys-
tem, which has never recovered from the War of 1914-1918, has
removed the possibility of a new flow of private capital on an
adequate scale, save for the most urgent, high-risk needs, such as
oil and ores. Even that weak possibility has been further dimin-
ished by acts of expropriation: acts presumably legal, in one
sense or another, but hardly encouraging to investors. And gov-
ernmental loans, or loans through international lending institu-
tions, are not yet available on a scale sufficient to promote
growth. Nor can internal financing be organized in most under-
developed countries, except on totalitarian terms of forced sav-
ing, or by destructive techniques of inflation. In country after
country freed from colonial status, every indispensable ingre-
dient of growth is missing. Many such countries lack the social
structure, the level of education, the governmental services, the
system of law, and the resources in capital, skill, energy, and ex-
perience which are needed to make a program of growth and
development a possibility. Unless international action is taken
soon, and imaginatively, these countries face the fate of Cos-
taguana,3 or worse.
3. In Conrad's Nostromo.
1957]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
The problems which these facts present for our country, and
for all free countries, are not exclusively, nor perhaps even pri-
marily, economic. The yearnings of people to conquer poverty,
and to improve their material lives, are real and strong. But the
peoples who are tasting new freedoms are also flexing their
muscles politically. In many areas, their politics have no assured
roots in tradition, and no close ties to the sanctions of law. Dic-
tatorship, aggression, exploitation, and regression are common
phenomena among the newly formed countries of the world, in
many of which strong forces are at work, seeking a return to
ancient local modes of despotism and tyranny, or to an imitation
of some of their modern forms. Local freedom for autocracy,
corruption, and stagnation is not "freedom" within the broad
intendment of the United Nations Charter. The United Nations
owes the newly Westernized countries of the world far more than
a flag, the trappings of sovereignty, and a seat in the General
Assembly. There is a great risk - perhaps the greatest risk
facing our foreign policy - that unless effective action is taken
soon by the United Nations, these strong local forces in many
"underdeveloped" countries will become firmly allied with inter-
ternational Communism, in the name of nationalist and anti-
"colonial" sentiment.
As we view the tide of nationalism which has engulfed large
parts of the world, and the threat of Communist imperialism,
backed by the ominous and even commanding rate of military
and economic growth in the Soviet Union and in China, it be-
comes clear that even the narrowest and most limited concept of
our security as a nation gives us an overriding national interest
in achieving a new law of nations, capable of preserving freedom,
and of organizing the conditions of human progress, for vast
areas of the earth which are or may become the potential prey
of Communism. Only such a conception of our foreign policy
could assure our security as a nation, and permit us to seek the
other legitimate goals of our foreign policy, without a crushing
and even impossible degree of permanent mobilization.
It is obvious for international as for municipal law that free-
dom without order is anarchy. Yet neither freedom nor order is
enough. They cannot bring peace or progress unless they are set
within a framework of law. For freedom is inconceivable with-
out law, and law is inconceivable without order. The task of pro-
tecting our national security, and the task of peace, are thus both
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no more and no less than the task of achieving law - a civilized
and acceptable law, a law of order and a law of justice - in the
relations among states and among peoples.
When President Wilson electrified the world with his great
call for peace without victory, almost forty years ago, he stressed
two ideas - the self-determination of peoples, and the creation
of a League of Nations to keep the peace, and to strive for justice.
The self-determination of peoples without a strong world organi-
zation, he saw, would be self-defeating. And so it turned out to
be. The old order crumbled after World War I. But the League
of Nations was impotent without American membership. The
new states-system gratified ancient nationalist dreams, but did
not satisfy even the most elementary requirements of order in
the world, upon which an effective system of international law
might have been built. The people and statesmen of the first
post-war era failed utterly in their responsibilities. The Axis
powers were allowed to destroy the balance of power. Britain
blundered, and so did all the other leaders of the old Entente.
The result was the Second World War - the Unnecessary War,
as Churchill rightly calls it.
Now, once again, the statesmen of a post-war generation con-
front some old equations, under new conditions. The problem for
our foreign policy, more urgent than ever, is still the same: to
help create a new order of law out of the ruins of the old.
Before talking about some of the crucial tasks of internation-
al law in this sense, let me clarify a preliminary point that often
arises: the relationship between law and force, between relying
on our own military strength and on our alliances, between power
politics and the presumably pure ideal of law.4 I assume, or
rather I hope, that the United Nations and its developing consti-
tutional practices will continue to be the focal point around which
the international law of the future will crystallize. But the
United Nations are not in any sense a substitute for national di-
plomacy or national military strength. Confronting difficult in-
ternational problems, we can never fall back on the empty for-
mula of passing responsibility to the United Nations. The United
Nations does not exist, and is not designed to exist, save as an
expression of the collective will of its members. As a method of
protecting national security, the United Nations is not an al-
4. This paragraph, and several which follow, borrow from a book review, 53
YALE L. J. 796, 799-800 (1944).
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ternative to our system of alliances, and our own military
strength, but a principal means through which those alliances,
and that strength, can express themselves diplomatically, and
otherwise. Like any other system of law, the United Nations is
not a substitute for force, but the sum total of the rules through
which the sanction of force can and should be used. To the extent
that it is accepted, it can, again like other legal systems, permit
the law to be enforced with minimal or token forces, and relieve
most citizens of the necessity of being armed to the teeth, like
medieval barons. But the United Nations does not displace the
conception of an international balance of power. Rather it em-
bodies and declares the balance of power which exists at any
moment.
Much of our thought about world problems is plagued by this
issue, which is perhaps the worst single aspect of our Wilsonian
legacy. The problem is variously defined as a supposed choice be-
tween "power politics" and "idealism," between "domination of
the Big Powers," and "equality for small nations," between
American virtue and European vice. The words and ideas get
almost hopelessly enmeshed. They provide one of the last argu-
ments of the isolationists, in the form of the doctrine that we
should be too proud, as we are too pure, to become entangled in
the dirty power politics of the world - a curious and extraordi-
nary idea to prevail among Americans, whose domestic politics
have always been human, not to say earthy, in their practical
compromises and adjustments. It is an extraordinary idea in
another sense as well. The course of world politics has always
involved the United States in general world wars, and pre-
sumably always will. It is hard to understand how we can be
expected to look after our vital national interest in controlling
this phenomenon by ignoring the political events which govern it.
However, the issue is planted deep in the public mind. Many
speakers and writers automatically fall back on hard words for
"power politics," as witness the current debate over the Middle
East. The phrase is hard to define, because the supposed choice
between power and other kinds of politics doesn't exist. What
alternative basis is there for political action, short of natural or
canonical law? How can the rules, customs, and legal norms
which govern the use of power conceal the fact that power is the
final constituent of social organization, and that the main pre-
occupation of law, municipal and international, is to control the
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exercise of authority in ways which fulfill accepted social and
ethical purposes? The uses of power are governed in each case
by the whole content of the culture in which men assert their au-
thority. However much the exercise of power is circumscribed
by history, courts, elections, charters, constitutions, or other
mechanisms of control, there is no evading the fact that it is
power we are talking about, and power which has the last word.
Nothing can alter the fact that there are large and small states,
states with and without military power. Power is exercised dif-
ferently by different countries, according to their cultural habits,
just as the ultimate police power within a state is differently
used in Switzerland, say, and Roumania, in Haiti and in Ver-
mont. Canada, the small neighbor of a great power, faces differ-
ent military risks than Belgium. The imaginary alternative be-
tween power and another basis for political action is false, and
the prevalence of the idea conceals and confuses real issues.
Yet the idea has a persistent appeal. A recent and character-
istic statement of Prime Minister Nehru, and some of the dec-
larations made before the Assembly of the United Nations on
events in Hungary, betray the weakness of this view. The Prime
Minister said, "As we stand today, . . .all these pacts and alli-
ances are completely out of place .... They are unnecessary. We
have developed a very strong protection (world public opinion)
against a country which acts wrongly. Why not adopt this pro-
tection instead of these armies and armaments and so on ?" And
before the United Nations, Mr. Krishna Menon, the Indian dele-
gate, remarked, "We do not believe that the basis of any modern
government, of any civilized government, can rest on the power
of arms from outside. We ourselves have a long experience of the
capacity of people to resist that intervention, and when the peo-
ples of a country, irrespective of the amount of physical force
that is applied against them, are determined to say 'no,' those
people are bound to succeed."6 While Mr. Menon's comments
have great significance, where national movements of liberation
are pitted against British, French, or American armed forces,
they have little meaning where military power is exercised as the
Russians, Chinese, and Nazis have been willing to use it.
5. Address at United Nations Reception, Dec. 20, 1956, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21,
1956, p. 4, cols. 6-8.
6. Statement of V. K. Krishna Menon, General Assembly of the United Na-
tions, Nov. 21, 1956, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1956, p. 14, col. 1.
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The existence of the United Nations, and the hopes we share
for its success, are not yet in any sense a substitute for our sov-
ereign responsibilities as a nation to restore and fortify the
Western Alliance, which has been so badly weakened during the
last few years, and to regain the lead in the armaments race. The
United Nations has not yet superseded the old system of national
states and national sovereignty, although its development has
begun to qualify some of the rights of sovereignty which were
freely acknowledged in earlier centuries. If the members of the
U.N. are loyal to the precedent of their success in Korea, it
should be possible to enforce the ban of Charter against aggres-
sive war with the backing of smaller and smaller national arma-
ments. But we have hardly reached the point where this rule is
self-enforcing.
If force is an indispensable element of law, it is not the whole
of it. The consensus of the United Nations membership ex-
presses more than the dominant power of its ruling coalitions. It
expresses also the conviction, or the aspiration, that force can
be used only in conformity with the principles of the Charter.
The decisions of the United Nations respond to a sense of exist-
ing force, and also to the power of certain ideas, whose appeal
derives jointly from the desire of men for decent rules of law,
and an acute sense of the universal risk of modern war if the
existing balance of power is allowed to swing too far in any di-
rection.
III
Viewing the United Nations in this context, what can be said
of its main functions, as part of the process of achieving an ac-
ceptable system of international law?
In the time remaining to me, I should like to concentrate on
two essential tasks of international law - first, the negative but
indispensable task of order - of containing Communist aggres-
sion, and dealing with other forms of aggression, so that the non-
Communist world, at a minimum, will be protected in its free-
dom. I shall have a few words to add about the even more diffi-
cult problem of Hungary - the problem of projecting the great
principle of the Korean precedent to a state which was allowed
to fall into Communist hands after 1945. The second, and equal-
ly important, function of international law is the more positive
and constructive one, of fulfilling for all the peoples of the world,
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and especially for those who have not yet themselves mastered
twentieth century techniques and procedures, the basic promises
of the United Nations Charter.
A. During this last decade of trial and error, much has been
gained in the slow, faltering development of the United Nations
as an instrument for protecting at least the free world against
aggression. The United Nations was launched as a new League
of Nations, seeking to profit both in its structure and in its strat-
egy from the failures of the old League. Unlike the League, it
was set up apart from the peace treaties which were expected to
liquidate the Second World War. Several of these peace treaties
have not yet been achieved. The United Nations has many func-
tions, and many useful fields of work. But its primary task, upon
which all the others depend, is that it succeed, in President Taft's
phrase, as a League to Keep the Peace.
In this realm, much has been accomplished, and much has not
been accomplished. Like any other statement of law, expressing
general aspirations, the United Nations Charter is a living or-
ganism which can survive even though its precepts do not always
instantly prevail. No body of law ever develops steadily or alto-
gether logically. It must grow from case to case -from the
resolution of conflicts, one after another, in the light of accepted
principles. Both the Magna Carta and the Constitution of the
United States have sometimes been honored in the breach for
periods when their full enforcement was beyond the will or the
capacity of the enforcing authorities. The members of the
United Nations did not prevent the East European satellites, or
China, or part of Indo-China, from being subverted to Commu-
nism, by procedures which had the form, save for recent events
in Hungary, of civil war or internal coup d'6tat. In the case of
Poland and other East European countries, these events took
place in defiance of the agreements of Yalta and Potsdam. On
the other hand, United Nations' action did succeed in protecting
Iran against dismemberment, and South Korea against invasion
from without. And Western diplomacy, backed by some military
measures, saved Greece and Turkey from being destroyed, and
deterred the Soviet Union from crushing the Tito revolt in Jugo-
slavia. Now, against the background of the United Nations'
achievement in Korea, the nations of the world confront a dual
crisis in the Middle East and in Middle Europe - a crisis which
in many ways tests and projects the Korean precedent, and dem-
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onstrates the powerful hold it has on the imagination of all peo-
ples, and the strength with which it challenges the international
law of the nineteenth century.
The crisis in the Middle East stems directly from the failure
of the great Western powers either to understand the causes of
war in the Middle East, or to act in time to eliminate them. The
United Nations acts, as I said a few moments ago, not of its own
will, but only when its members press effectively for action. For
several years, Egypt has been openly committing what would
have been regarded in the nineteenth century as acts of war or
close to acts of war-acts of war against Israel, in denying Israel
the use of the Suez Canal, and through armed raids over the Armi-
stice demarcation line; acts of war against France, in the train-
ing and support of armed rebels in French North Africa; and
acts of great provocation and hostility against Great Britain,
both through the seizure of the Suez Canal, and in other ways.
Egypt indulged in large military expenditures, and openly an-
nounced ambitious plans for military aggression. Egypt ignored
a succession of Security Council resolutions on these and related
issues, and the Western powers failed to raise them before the
Assembly, when Security Council action proved unavailing. Con-
ventional diplomacy, through the United Nations and otherwise,
not only failed to stop these acts of war, but made the situation
worse- by helping to force the British out of the Suez Canal
zone; by driving the Egyptian government, and the Syrian gov-
ernment, into the hands of the Soviets; by failing to take due
note of the Egyptian government's announced purpose of de-
stroying Israel, and uniting all of North Africa and the Middle
East into a gigantic Arab Empire; and finally by so conducting
the Suez Canal negotiations as to destroy the relationship of
political trust, and indeed even the conventional diplomatic con-
tacts, between our government and those of its chief allies. The
result was a reversion to self-help, on the nineteenth century
model, on the part of Israel, France, and Great Britain. This was
followed, in world opinion, by a violent reaction - an assertion
of preference for action by and through the United Nations,
backed in this case by sinister threats from the Soviet Union.
Thus we confront a dramatic clash between nineteenth cen-
tury international law and the post-Korean international law of
our times - a crisis with many threads, a crisis which will help
determine and fix the international law under which we live, a
[Vol. XVII
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crisis in which the powerful ideas behind the Korean precedent
are being tested, it is true, but also one in which that momentous
event in law will in turn help to shape the outcome of events.
Here, as in other settings, the law can hardly enforce itself. To
prevail, it requires the loyalty to law, the understanding, and
above all the will to act, of the nations which believe in law, and
especially of the United States. We have suffered a series of
diplomatic defeats in the Middle East - very serious defeats.
But as a nation with great inherent strength, and as the nation
with the most to gain from the successful development of an ac-
cepted system of international law, we should come forward with
all our influence to press for a cordial restoration of the Western
alliance, and for a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle
East - not merely a restoration of the unhealthy and illegal con-
ditions which prevailed last month, but a lasting resolution of
the whole complex of conflict which produced the recent ex-
plosion.
When we turn to the Hungarian problem, we see the Korean
precedent in another perspective. At first glance, the facts are
simple: the Hungarian government, duly recognized, and a mem-
ber of the United Nations, asked that body for help, alleging that
acts of aggression were violating its sovereign rights. Hungary
had been attacked by armed forces of the Soviet Union, stationed
on Hungarian territory for quite different purposes, under a
treaty which the government of Hungary said it wanted to de-
nounce. After a week of brutal slaughter, a puppet regime was
installed in Hungary, despite the continuance of a general strike.
There are other vantage points from which this cycle of
events should be examined. Until now, all tests of the capacity of
the family of nations to repress or conciliate situations of war
have taken place beyond the mysterious boundaries marked by
the presence of Soviet troops in 1945. These are not boundaries
of the Soviet Union, nor even of a Soviet sphere of influence, in
any sense we have accepted, juridically or otherwise. We have
always contended that the agreements of Yalta and Potsdam
called for free elections in Eastern Europe - elections which
have not yet occurred. And the United Nations Charter is not in
form at least linked to the boundaries marked by the presence of
various armies in 1945, but speaks in the universal language of
equal sovereignty, and equal protection, for all states, large and
small. However, Hungary is close to the Soviet Union. Despite
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the survival of democratic Finland, Norway, and Sweden, which
are also close to the Soviet Union, the emergence of a democratic
regime in Hungary would represent an alarming defeat for So-
viet policy, which would have far-reaching consequences in all
the satellites, and perhaps in Russia itself. Such a prospect
might well provoke dangerous reactions of great fear in the
Soviet government, which could only be relieved by imaginative
and effective diplomacy. In Hungary, for once, unlike the cases
of China, Greece, Korea, and Iran, we faced an episode which the
Soviets did not start, and did not want started. Although the
Soviets have shown no scruples about trying to cross the line of
1945 in raids against us, we have so far been totally unwilling
in any way to venture across that line ourselves, save in the
Jugoslavian case.
Moreover, the Hungarian crisis came at a moment when the
Western Alliance had been allowed to disintegrate, and probably
came about in its present form only because the Alliance had
been allowed to disintegrate. It came, that is to say, at a moment
when a wisely conceived and concerted diplomatic response from
the West was unavailable, even if the will to respond existed.
When fighting started in Hungary, the great issue was whether
the Russians would dare to use their own troops- or rather
would dare to move new, uncontaminated troops into Hungary,
to repress the Hungarian protest. We can safely guess that coun-
sels in the Soviet Union were divided on the subject, for the use
of Soviet troops in Hungary signalled the end of the de-Staliniza-
tion policy, the end of the brief renaissance of law in the Soviet
world, the revival of the power of the secret police - and a great
blow to the Communist parties and to Soviet diplomacy in Eu-
rope, Asia, and Africa. At that moment, our Secretary of State
announced that whatever happened in Eastern Europe, we would
not use force to help the satellites regain their freedom7 - surely
one of the most ill-advised statements in the history of diplomacy.
Even if it were true, it was hardly the thing to say, while the
Soviet government was trying to decide whether to risk using its
own troops in Hungary. In due course, the Soviets moved new
divisions into Hungary, and put them to bloody work. Many
alternative diplomatic approaches to the Hungarian crisis on our
part can readily be imagined, designed to dissuade the Soviets
from this fatal step, and to combine deterrence with legitimate
7. N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1956, p. 1, col. 4.
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reassurance. So far as is publicly known, the three great West-
ern powers took no such steps.
Thus we must remark a new and ominous development in
American foreign policy. The fear of atomic war seems to par-
alyze our diplomacy, but not that of our rivals. This was not the
case when our foreign policy rose to the challenge of the Berlin
airlift, to aggression in Korea and Iran, and to threatened ag-
gression in Jugoslavia and Turkey. The Great-Power stalemate
rests on the reality that, given present conditions of scientific
knowledge, the Soviets could not hope decisively to win a full
scale war, and could well have their regime destroyed at home if
a full scale war broke out. This calculation cannot be considered
to keep us from taking legitimate action to protect our interests.
We have repeatedly taken such action during the post-war dec-
ade without provoking atomic war. Our willingness to take such
risks is the only force that could in the long run prevent the pres-
ent precarious balance of world power from deteriorating fur-
ther, and thus making full scale war almost inevitable.
You will recall Oppenheimer's metaphor that atomic weapons
convert the relations of the United States and of the Soviet
Union into the relations of two scorpions in a bottle, each afraid
to sting for fear of being stung in turn. Now the Soviet has
moved in Hungary, and threatened to move in the Middle East,
confident that our fear of atomic war would make us impotent.
This is not a posture from which we can for long expect to de-
fend our vital security interests. Mutual restraint between us
and the Soviet Union, as in the conduct of the Berlin airlift and
the Korean War, must rest on far deeper factors of comparative
strength, and of mutual interests in avoiding large-scale war,
than those revealed by the Hungarian case. A continuance of
our attitude of resignation, such as that so far displayed in
regard to Hungary, can only invite further experiments, and
ultimate disaster. Until we have rebuilt our alliances, and de--
veloped a common Western policy, both with regard to the Middle,
East and Middle Europe, there is little we can do. Our diplomacy
failed to deter Soviet aggression in Hungary, or Soviet inter-
vention in the Middle East. Indeed, it did not even try to do so.
Neither diplomacy nor military action is available at the moment
to undo the consequences of these failures. We must start think-
ing about the future from these bleak and even tragic facts.
1957]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Yet all is not lost, even in Hungary. Vigorous and concerted
diplomatic action, if it can be organized, could well prevail, given
the force of the movement for de-Stalinization within the Com-
munist bloc, and all the human and political factors which that
immense explosion represents. These were great events, and we
should be able to call upon them, as facts which may in the end
permit co-existence, or even a Soviet retreat. In any event we
must do everything we can to seek this end, for the alternatives
are dark indeed. But such a course will not come about without
Western unity, Western determination, and Western loyalty to
the principle of Korea, which, as President Truman properly
said, alone could prevent a Third World War. The Soviet gov-
ernment should be made privately to understand that it would
be extremely difficult for the Western Powers, and the United
Nations, to refrain from such action as was taken in Korea if
the. Hungarian pattern were to be repeated in Poland, East Ger-
many, or Czechoslovakia.
B. I should like to speak briefly about the other side of the
medal - the problems of the United Nations which arise in the
sphere of economic and social development.
Behind the facade of progress and integration in the world,
there is an ominous fact, which must become a central issue for
cooperative international action: The poor countries, by and
large, are getting poorer, while the rich are getting richer. The
standard of living of the average human being in the world is
probably lower now than it was twenty-five years ago, and per-
haps. lower than it was in 1900. While some few nations are
rapidly raising their standards of living, the poorer nations, with
large and rising populations, are standing still, or growing much
more slowly. While we think of the world as ever more closely
integrated, by air transport and improved communication, the
mechanisms of international economic integration are weaker
today than they were in 1914. The free movement of, goods,
capital, and of people - the forces which permitted the United
States and Canada to grow rapidly, before the first World War,
and; since - are severely restricted. The break-up of empires
has further limited the flow of capital for development, and
helped to destroy the political: foundations which could permit
such movements to take place. Yet the world must be put to-
gether again, or it will blow up. A widening gap between the
standards of living of the rich and the poor is wrong among
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the peoples of the world, as it would .be wrong among our own
people. It represents a failure of policy, a challenge to our sense
of justice and decency. If allowed to continue, such a gap will
become an explosive force in world politics, of potentially ,over-
whelming importance."
But how can the society of nations help to organize effective
programs for economic development if many countries are with-
out an entrepreneurial, managerial or governmental middle class,
without modern educational systems, without capital or habits
of saving, without statistics or essential economic facilities,
such as transport, communication, and public health? Many
countries which need help in development lack the social or gov-
ernmental machinery which is indispensable to modern economic
life. How can development programs succeed without the sup-
port of a large-scale international flow of public or private
capital, and without a regime of law, and a structure of expecta-
tions, which could permit a revival of the international private
capital market? How can development in this sense succeed if
some of the great creditor countries, notably the United States,
fail to carry out the commercial policies required.to make certain
promising lines of development worthwhile, and self-sustaining?
These are all real and rather unpleasant barriers to progress,
which the world-wide epidemic of nationalism, chauvinism, and
xenophobia tends to make worse.
I wish to suggest this thought: that if we are to be serious -
and we should be very serious, for strong reasons of self-inter-
est - about helping to organize the conditions of progress in -the
non-industralized areas of the free world, we shall need not only
an adequate program of capital grants, but a complicated pro-
gram of human and technical assistance, which would help the
so-called "underdeveloped" countries get into a position where
they could actually use capital imports effectively, and where
they could attract capital, in competition with other potential
users of funds. We shall need foreign advisers, technicians, and
experts - sometimes, in extreme cases, where local government
has really broken down, experts with the power to act. Interna-
tional law, like other systems of law, must make provision for
bankruptcy. To be politically acceptable, and to avoid latent
fears of colonialism, such programs should be conducted where
possible under United Nations auspices. For there will be no
8. See MYRDAL, AN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY (1956).
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great movement of economic growth and development in many
of the non-industralized parts of the free world unless the West-
ern countries, and the United Nations, take over and succeed in
performing some of the vital developmental functions which the
old imperial regimes carried out during the nineteenth century.
IV
I have tried to sketch out the political setting in which the
international law of our times is being hammered out, trans-
forming, or rather qualifying, the old international law. I have
pointed to two great areas - the control of the use of force in
international relations, and the problem of organizing economic
development in underdeveloped countries - which will demand
a great deal of us in the years ahead.
What bearing do these tasks have on the work of the law
schools? That, after all, is part of what I was asked to talk about
today.
In the first place, I believe that just as every lawyer should
study constitutional law, even though he is never going to have
a constitutional case, so he should study public international law,
for the sake of his formation as a lawyer. To master his own
role and function, every lawyer should understand the place of
what he does in the grand design of the whole legal system. To
this end, he should be familiar with the machinery, the key ideas,
and the procedures through which our rights, obligations, and
status as a nation are fixed.
More than that, given the present international position of
the United States, there are now international elements in many
business transactions, and many problems - taxation, labor,
estates, antitrust, banking, and commerce of all kinds - often
have international ramifications, so that private international
law and comparative law are much more practical subjects than
they used to be, in the so-called bread and butter training of
lawyers.
But these are secondary aspects of the problem, in my judg-
ment. The great role which the law schools should play in the
development of international law in the immediate future is
intellectual and scholarly, and is part of their responsibility as
centers of study. The alarming state of international law con-
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fronts the United States with a challenge - a grave challenge
involving our very survival as a nation. The successful realiza-
tion of the goals of our foreign policy through international law
will require the highest quality of creative thought our culture
can muster up. Without such bold and inventive thinking, our
foreign policy may well fail, despite the moral quality, the loy-
alty, and the political instincts and judgment of our people and
their government. Our universities, and our law schools, should
be able to contribute much to the development of a new inter-
national law which could protect the nation, and provide for all
peoples the elemental protection of an opportunity to pursue
their own salvation. The threatened position of our nation in
the world makes great demands upon those whose job it is to
think about the future of international law, and to train lawyers
who will be ready to take their places in the practice or in the
government - in the trenches where the new international law
will be made. The study of these problems requires an under-
standing of history and of politics, and a sound judgment as to
the limits and risks of the possible in international relations.
The challenge of international law today offers our lawyers, our
law schools and our people, a great moment. The character of
the task recalls Holmes' remark, that in this realm, the price of
error is death.
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